Team:Caltech/Biosafety
From 2008.igem.org
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==General Concerns== | ==General Concerns== | ||
- | There are risks in probiotic engineering that | + | There are risks in probiotic engineering that must be addressed before our system can be implemented in humans. One common risk is increasing the chance of bacterial sepsis for those who are immune deficient. Other risk factors include the impact on premature infants, CVC (central venous catheter), cardiac vascular disease, and diarrhea<sup>1</sup>. It is also unclear how probiotics affect host metabolic activities. However, the unmodified Nissle 1917 strain has been shown to be safe for long term use<sup>2</sup>. |
The engineered probiotic will persist in the gut longer if antibiotics are used to suppress other gut flora<sup>3</sup>. However, such resistance may pass over into pathogenic strains and cause future problems for the host. The concern of introducing foreign genes into the gut is described below for each individual project. | The engineered probiotic will persist in the gut longer if antibiotics are used to suppress other gut flora<sup>3</sup>. However, such resistance may pass over into pathogenic strains and cause future problems for the host. The concern of introducing foreign genes into the gut is described below for each individual project. | ||
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===Oxidative Burst=== | ===Oxidative Burst=== | ||
*'''Short Term:''' There are no safety concerns beyond that of typical ''E. coli'' lab strains. Considering that 260 mM H<sub>2</sub>O<sub>2</sub> is applied directly to the skin to disinfect cuts and scrapes, the 800 uM H<sub>2</sub>O<sub>2</sub> produced by the engineered strain should not be a health concern to anyone working in the lab. | *'''Short Term:''' There are no safety concerns beyond that of typical ''E. coli'' lab strains. Considering that 260 mM H<sub>2</sub>O<sub>2</sub> is applied directly to the skin to disinfect cuts and scrapes, the 800 uM H<sub>2</sub>O<sub>2</sub> produced by the engineered strain should not be a health concern to anyone working in the lab. | ||
- | *'''Long Term:''' Production of hydrogen peroxide is not a normal occurrence in the large intestine, and its effects would need to be investigated before the engineered strain could be used to fight infection. Some concerns of hydrogen peroxide production in the intestine | + | *'''Long Term:''' Production of hydrogen peroxide is not a normal occurrence in the large intestine, and its effects would need to be investigated before the engineered strain could be used to fight infection. Some concerns of hydrogen peroxide production in the intestine are listed below: |
- | ** | + | **bowel irritation<sup>4</sup>. |
- | ** | + | **killing of the native gut flora. |
- | ** | + | **damage to gut epithelial cells. |
- | **the ability to produce peroxide | + | **transmission of the ability to produce peroxide to other gut flora. |
===Phage Pathogen Defense=== | ===Phage Pathogen Defense=== | ||
- | * Phage therapy is generally not harmful to the host due to phage specificity to bacterial hosts. However, | + | * Phage therapy is generally not harmful to the host due to phage specificity to bacterial hosts. However, separate complications associated with phage therapy exist: |
** Often times, there are pathogenic and benign strains of the same species of bacteria, and when targeting a species of pathogen, the associated benign strains could be destroyed as well. | ** Often times, there are pathogenic and benign strains of the same species of bacteria, and when targeting a species of pathogen, the associated benign strains could be destroyed as well. | ||
** Bacterial lysis leads to a release of endotoxins within the host, this could lead to a variety of side effects including fever and toxic shock[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herxheimer_reaction] | ** Bacterial lysis leads to a release of endotoxins within the host, this could lead to a variety of side effects including fever and toxic shock[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herxheimer_reaction] | ||
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** In the simple FimE constructs, when the promoter starts in the configuration pointing upstream, DNA upstream of the constructs may be transcribed by the cell. | ** In the simple FimE constructs, when the promoter starts in the configuration pointing upstream, DNA upstream of the constructs may be transcribed by the cell. | ||
** In the final design, the terminator that sits in the population variation generator may not be 100% efficient. Thus, the efficiency of the terminator should be tested before genes that are hazardous when co-expressed are placed into the system. | ** In the final design, the terminator that sits in the population variation generator may not be 100% efficient. Thus, the efficiency of the terminator should be tested before genes that are hazardous when co-expressed are placed into the system. | ||
- | ** The engineered FimE system may interfere with natural fimbriae expression in Nissle 1917 or other gut flora. Since fimbriae are important for intestinal colonization, this could | + | ** The engineered FimE system may interfere with natural fimbriae expression in Nissle 1917 or other gut flora. Since fimbriae are important for intestinal colonization, this could affect the intestinal composition<sup>5</sup>. |
==References== | ==References== | ||
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# Rao S, Hu S, McHugh L, Lueders K, Henry K, Zhao Q, Fekete RA, Kar S, Adhya S, and Hamer DH. '''Toward a live microbial microbicide for HIV: commensal bacteria secreting an HIV fusion inhibitor peptide'''. ''Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A'' 2005 Aug 23; 102(34) 11993-8. | # Rao S, Hu S, McHugh L, Lueders K, Henry K, Zhao Q, Fekete RA, Kar S, Adhya S, and Hamer DH. '''Toward a live microbial microbicide for HIV: commensal bacteria secreting an HIV fusion inhibitor peptide'''. ''Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A'' 2005 Aug 23; 102(34) 11993-8. | ||
# Ackermann M, Stecher B, Freed NE, Songhet P, Hardt WD, and Doebeli M. '''Self-destructive cooperation mediated by phenotypic noise'''. ''Nature'' 2008 Aug 21; 454(7207) 987-90. | # Ackermann M, Stecher B, Freed NE, Songhet P, Hardt WD, and Doebeli M. '''Self-destructive cooperation mediated by phenotypic noise'''. ''Nature'' 2008 Aug 21; 454(7207) 987-90. | ||
+ | # Stentebjerg-Olesen B, Chakraborty T, and Klemm P. '''Type 1 fimbriation and phase switching in a natural Escherichia coli fimB null strain, Nissle 1917'''. ''J Bacteriol'' 1999 Dec; 181(24) 7470-8. | ||
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Latest revision as of 23:57, 29 October 2008
People
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Biosafety Concerns
General ConcernsThere are risks in probiotic engineering that must be addressed before our system can be implemented in humans. One common risk is increasing the chance of bacterial sepsis for those who are immune deficient. Other risk factors include the impact on premature infants, CVC (central venous catheter), cardiac vascular disease, and diarrhea1. It is also unclear how probiotics affect host metabolic activities. However, the unmodified Nissle 1917 strain has been shown to be safe for long term use2. The engineered probiotic will persist in the gut longer if antibiotics are used to suppress other gut flora3. However, such resistance may pass over into pathogenic strains and cause future problems for the host. The concern of introducing foreign genes into the gut is described below for each individual project. Subproject ConcernsOxidative Burst
Phage Pathogen Defense
Lactose Intolerance
Vitamin Production
Population Variation
References
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