Team:Caltech/Biosafety
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** In the simple FimE constructs, when the promoter starts in the configuration pointing upstream, DNA upstream of the constructs may be transcribed by the cell. | ** In the simple FimE constructs, when the promoter starts in the configuration pointing upstream, DNA upstream of the constructs may be transcribed by the cell. | ||
** In the final design, the terminator that sits in the population variation generator may not be 100% efficient. Thus, the efficiency of the terminator should be tested before genes that are hazardous when co-expressed are placed into the system. | ** In the final design, the terminator that sits in the population variation generator may not be 100% efficient. Thus, the efficiency of the terminator should be tested before genes that are hazardous when co-expressed are placed into the system. | ||
- | ** The engineered FimE system may interfere with natural fimbriae expression in Nissle 1917 or other gut flora. Since fimbriae are important for intestinal colonization, this could affect the intestinal composition. | + | ** The engineered FimE system may interfere with natural fimbriae expression in Nissle 1917 or other gut flora. Since fimbriae are important for intestinal colonization, this could affect the intestinal composition<sup>5</sup>. |
==References== | ==References== | ||
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# Rao S, Hu S, McHugh L, Lueders K, Henry K, Zhao Q, Fekete RA, Kar S, Adhya S, and Hamer DH. '''Toward a live microbial microbicide for HIV: commensal bacteria secreting an HIV fusion inhibitor peptide'''. ''Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A'' 2005 Aug 23; 102(34) 11993-8. | # Rao S, Hu S, McHugh L, Lueders K, Henry K, Zhao Q, Fekete RA, Kar S, Adhya S, and Hamer DH. '''Toward a live microbial microbicide for HIV: commensal bacteria secreting an HIV fusion inhibitor peptide'''. ''Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A'' 2005 Aug 23; 102(34) 11993-8. | ||
# Ackermann M, Stecher B, Freed NE, Songhet P, Hardt WD, and Doebeli M. '''Self-destructive cooperation mediated by phenotypic noise'''. ''Nature'' 2008 Aug 21; 454(7207) 987-90. | # Ackermann M, Stecher B, Freed NE, Songhet P, Hardt WD, and Doebeli M. '''Self-destructive cooperation mediated by phenotypic noise'''. ''Nature'' 2008 Aug 21; 454(7207) 987-90. | ||
+ | # Stentebjerg-Olesen B, Chakraborty T, and Klemm P. '''Type 1 fimbriation and phase switching in a natural Escherichia coli fimB null strain, Nissle 1917'''. ''J Bacteriol'' 1999 Dec; 181(24) 7470-8. | ||
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Revision as of 10:39, 29 October 2008
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Biosafety Concerns
General ConcernsThere are risks in probiotic engineering that may prevent or delay our system from being implemented in humans. One common risk is increasing the chance of bacterial sepsis for those who are immune deficient. Other risk factors include premature infants, CVC (central venous catheter), cardiac vascular disease, and diarrhea1. We are also unsure of the effects that probiotics have on host metabolic activities. However, the unmodified Nissle 1917 strain has been shown to be safe for long term use2. The engineered probiotic will persist in the gut longer if antibiotics are used to suppress other gut flora3. However, such resistance may pass over into pathogenic strains and cause future problems for the host. The concern of introducing foreign genes into the gut is described below for each individual project. Subproject ConcernsOxidative Burst
Phage Pathogen Defense
Lactose Intolerance
Vitamin Production
Population Variation
References
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