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Team:Freiburg/Ethics
From 2008.igem.org
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Information on the DNA or RNA of pathogenic organisms may be received from different databases and scientific publications. Synthetic sequences can be ordered from specialized companies, for manageable prices. Finally, these sequences could be assembled to highly effective pathogens. | Information on the DNA or RNA of pathogenic organisms may be received from different databases and scientific publications. Synthetic sequences can be ordered from specialized companies, for manageable prices. Finally, these sequences could be assembled to highly effective pathogens. | ||
This scenario illustrates how difficult it is to build effective barriers. Because synthetic biology is driven by the simplification of part assemblies it also simplifies abuse. It is undoubtedly important, to control dangerous products of synthetic biology and consistently apply regulations. The case of synthetic biology shows that the problem of technical abuse is not solved by decreasing technical possibilities, but rather that motivations and reasons, to perpetrate abuses, should be understood and eliminated.<br> | This scenario illustrates how difficult it is to build effective barriers. Because synthetic biology is driven by the simplification of part assemblies it also simplifies abuse. It is undoubtedly important, to control dangerous products of synthetic biology and consistently apply regulations. The case of synthetic biology shows that the problem of technical abuse is not solved by decreasing technical possibilities, but rather that motivations and reasons, to perpetrate abuses, should be understood and eliminated.<br> | ||
| - | Also the effects of synthetic organisms on the environment and ecosystems must be considered. For the environment there are risks, when synthetic organisms are introduced the food chain or when synthetic organisms come into contact with humans for medical purposes. For the environment any use of synthetic life outside the lab means a risk, because a mixture of natural and artificial gene pool can occur. | + | Also the effects of synthetic organisms on the environment and ecosystems must be considered. For the environment there are risks, when synthetic organisms are introduced into the food chain or when synthetic organisms come into contact with humans for medical purposes. For the environment any use of synthetic life outside the lab means a risk, because a mixture of natural and artificial gene pool can occur. |
There are projects (e.g. Synbiosafe) concerning the unpredictability of the proliferation from synthetic organisms. Among other things there is an attempt to provide these organisms with a gene for automatic self destruction in case of uncontrolled proliferation.<br> | There are projects (e.g. Synbiosafe) concerning the unpredictability of the proliferation from synthetic organisms. Among other things there is an attempt to provide these organisms with a gene for automatic self destruction in case of uncontrolled proliferation.<br> | ||
However, creating life means to create something that has the ability to reproduce and mutate itself and therefore gains autonomy. | However, creating life means to create something that has the ability to reproduce and mutate itself and therefore gains autonomy. | ||
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*Jeronimo Cello, Aniko V. Paul, Eckard Wimmer (2002): Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template, in Science Vol. 297. no. 5583, pp. 1016 - 1018<br> | *Jeronimo Cello, Aniko V. Paul, Eckard Wimmer (2002): Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template, in Science Vol. 297. no. 5583, pp. 1016 - 1018<br> | ||
*Terrence M. Tumpey, Christopher F. Basler, Patricia V. Aguilar, Hui Zeng, Alicia Solórzano, David E. Swayne, Nancy J. Cox, Jacqueline M. Katz, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, Peter Palese, Adolfo García-Sastre (2005):Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus, in Science 310 (5745), 77-80 | *Terrence M. Tumpey, Christopher F. Basler, Patricia V. Aguilar, Hui Zeng, Alicia Solórzano, David E. Swayne, Nancy J. Cox, Jacqueline M. Katz, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, Peter Palese, Adolfo García-Sastre (2005):Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus, in Science 310 (5745), 77-80 | ||
| + | *http://www.synbiosafe.eu/ | ||
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Latest revision as of 02:29, 30 October 2008
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Safety |
_safety
IntroductionThe experience, of last years iGEM competition clearly shows that students are willing to develop useful applications. They provided medical, environmental, or mathematical/computational applications, with no reason to hide themselves behind official scientific projects. The fact that students already deal with real scientific projects should expand their sense of responsibility. Normally, universities provide basic knowledge and practical skills, but the opportunity to establish own scientific projects is rare. On the one hand enabling students to develop own projects is reasonable, on the other hand a safety problem could occur if this trust is betrayed.
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