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Team:Freiburg/Ethics
From 2008.igem.org
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In times of unlimited communication and information access, nearly everybody has the possibility to get DNA sequences from pathogenic organisms. It has never before been so easy to create biological weapons, for example Viruses. Two experiments have illustrated the possibilities of abuse by the technique of synthetic biology. In 2002, scientists succeeded in rebuilding a Polio Virus by ordering synthetic DNA from commercial companies and assembled the Virus in their laboratory. Even more spectacular is an attempt by American scientists in 2005. They had successfully tried to reconstruct the genetic information of the flu virus responsible for the highly contagious Spanish flu. The Virus was extinct, but its RNA could be isolated from the tissue of deceased, sequenced and finally the original virus was synthesized. | In times of unlimited communication and information access, nearly everybody has the possibility to get DNA sequences from pathogenic organisms. It has never before been so easy to create biological weapons, for example Viruses. Two experiments have illustrated the possibilities of abuse by the technique of synthetic biology. In 2002, scientists succeeded in rebuilding a Polio Virus by ordering synthetic DNA from commercial companies and assembled the Virus in their laboratory. Even more spectacular is an attempt by American scientists in 2005. They had successfully tried to reconstruct the genetic information of the flu virus responsible for the highly contagious Spanish flu. The Virus was extinct, but its RNA could be isolated from the tissue of deceased, sequenced and finally the original virus was synthesized. | ||
Information on the DNA or RNA of pathogenic organisms may be received from different databases and scientific publications. Synthetic sequences can be ordered from specialized companies, for menageable prices. Finally, these sequences could be assembled to highly effective pathogens. | Information on the DNA or RNA of pathogenic organisms may be received from different databases and scientific publications. Synthetic sequences can be ordered from specialized companies, for menageable prices. Finally, these sequences could be assembled to highly effective pathogens. | ||
| - | This scenario illustrates how difficult it is to build effective barriers. Because those properties of the new science, which are characterizing and | + | This scenario illustrates how difficult it is to build effective barriers. Because those properties of the new science, which are characterizing and pushing it ahead, are properties simplifying the abuse. It is undoubtedly important, to control dangerous products of synthetic biology and consistently apply regulations. The case of synthetic biology shows that the problem of technical abuse is not solved by decreasing technical possibilities, but rather that motivations and reasons, to perpetrate abuses, should be understood and eliminated. |
Revision as of 14:00, 29 October 2008
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Safety |
_biosafety
IntroductionThe experience, last years iGEM mediated us, clearly shows that students are willing to develop useful applications. They provided medical, environmental or mathematical/computational applications, with no reason to hide themselves from other scientific projects. The fact that students already deal with real scientific projects should expand their sense of responsibility. Normally universities provide basic knowledge and practical skills, but the opportunity to establish own scientific projects is rare. On the one hand enabling students to develop own projects is reasonable, on the other hand a safety problem could occur if this trust is betrayed.
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